

CHAPTER 8

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1	HAZID Check list
APPENDIX 2	HAZOP Worksheet
APPENDIX 3	NG Flow Diagram
APPENDIX 4	Fault Tree Analysis
APPENDIX 5	Event Tree Analysis
APPENDIX 6	Generic failure frequency for NG station
APPENDIX 7	Frequency estimation using PACM
APPENDIX 8	Plant specific equipment data
APPENDIX 9	Example Calculation for Process vessel
APPENDIX 10	Bayesian network of NG frequency
APPENDIX 11	PACM with Bayesian network
APPENDIX 12	Bayesian Spread sheets
APPENDIX 13	PAPERS PUBLISHED / UNDER REVIEW
APPENDIX 14	C.V OF THE SCHOLAR

APPENDIX 1 (Section 3.3)

HAZID CHECK LIST

Category	Guideword	Expanders
		(Examples of guide word application - not exclusive)
External & Environmental Hazards		
Natural and Environmental Hazards	Climate Extremes	Temperature, waves, wind, dust, flooding, sandstorms, ice, blizzards
	Lightning	
	Earthquakes	
	Erosion	Ground slide, coastal, riverine
	Subsidence	Ground structure, foundations, reservoir depletion
Created (Man-made) Hazards	Security Hazards	Internal and external security threats
	Terrorist Activity	Riots, civil disturbance, strikes, military action, political unrest
Effect of the Facility on the Surroundings	Geographical - Infrastructure	Plant location, plant layout, pipeline routing, area minimization
	Proximity to Population	
	Adjacent Land Use	Crop burning, airfields, accommodation camps
	Proximity to Transport Corridors	Shipping lanes, air routes, roads, etc.
	Environmental Issues	Previous land use, vulnerable fauna and flora, visual impact
	Social Issues	Local population, local attitude, social/cultural areas of significance
Infrastructure	Normal Communications	Road links, air links, water links
	Communications for Contingency planning	
	Supply Support	Consumables/spares holding
Environmental Damage	Continuous Plant Discharges to Air	Flares, vents, fugitive emissions, energy efficiency
	Continuous Plant Discharges to Water	Target / legislative requirements, drainage facilities, oil / water separation
	Continuous Plant Discharges to Soil	Drainage, chemical storage
	Emergency/upset Discharges	Flares, vents, drainage
	Contaminated Ground	Previous use or events
	Facility Impact	Area minimization, pipeline routing, environmental impact assessment
	Waste Disposal Options	
	Timing of Construction	Seasons, periods of environmental significance
Facility Hazards		

Control Methods / Philosophy	Manning/operations Philosophy	Effect on design, effect on locality (Manned, unmanned, visited)
	Operations Concept	1 train, x-trains, simplification
	Maintenance Philosophy	Plant/train/equipment item, heavy lifting, access, override, bypass, commonality of equipment, transport
Category	Guideword	Expanders <i>(Examples of guide word application - not exclusive)</i>
	Control Philosophy	Appropriate technology, (DCS / local panels)
	Manning Levels	Accommodation, travel and support requirements. Consistency with operations and maintenance, etc. philosophies
	Emergency Response	Isolation, ESD philosophy, blowdown, flaring requirements
	Concurrent Operations	Production, maintenance requirements
	Start-up Shutdown	Modular or plant wide
Fire and Explosion Hazards	Stored Flammables	Improper storage, operator error (release), defect, impact, fire (mitigation measures include: substitute nonflammable, minimize and separate inventory)
	Sources of Ignition	Electricity, flares, sparks, hot surfaces (mitigation measures include: identify, remove, separate)
	Equipment Layout	Confinement, escalation following release of explosive or flammable fluid (operator error, defect, impact process control failure, corrosion), module layout/proximity, orientation of equipment, predominant wind direction (mitigation measures include: reduce degree of confinement, spacing based on consequence assessment, escalation barriers)
	Fire Protection and Response	Active/passive insulation, fire / gas detection, blow down / relief system philosophy, firefighting facilities
	Operator Protection	Means of escape, PPE, communications, emergency response, plant evacuation
	Inventory	Excess hazardous material (mitigation measures include: minimise hazardous inventory, alternate processes and utility systems)
Process Hazards	Release of inventory	Excessive process stress, impact (penetration by foreign object), process control failure, structural failure, erosion or corrosion (mitigation measures include: recognise and minimise process hazards during design, inherently safe plant, containment and recovery measures)
	Over Pressure	Offsite sources, process blockage, thermal expansion, connection of process to utility systems, chemical reaction
		Atmospheric conditions, blowdown, fire, hot surfaces, chemical reaction

	Over/under Temperature	
	Excess / Zero Level	Overfill storage tanks, loss of function in separation vessels, blow by to downstream vessels
	Wrong Composition / Phase	Offsite contamination, failure of separation process, build-up of wrong phase (sand, hydrates, etc.), toxic substances
Utility Systems	Firewater Systems	
	Fuel Gas	
	Heating Medium	
	Diesel Fuel	
	Power Supply	
	Steam	
	Drains	
	Inert Gas	
	Waste Storage and Treatment	
Category	Guideword	Expanders <i>(Examples of guide word application - not exclusive)</i>
	Chemical/fuel Storage	
	Potable Water	
	Sewerage	
Maintenance Hazards	Access Requirements	
	Override Necessity	
	Bypasses Required	
	Commonality of Equipment	
	Heavy Lifting Requirements	
	Transport	
Construction/ Existing Facilities	Tie-ins (shutdown requirements) Concurrent Operations	
	Reuse of Material	
	Common Equipment Capacity	
	Interface – Shutdown / blowdown / ESD	
	Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipment (congestion)	
	Soil Contamination (existing facilities)	
	Mobilization/ demobilization	
Health Hazards		
Health Hazards	Disease Hazards	Endemic diseases, infection, malarial mosquitoes, hygiene - personal and / or catering, contaminated water or foodstuff, social, e.g. AIDS, VD, etc. stagnant water, poor living conditions
	Asphyxiation hazards	Asphyxiating atmospheres, failure to use appropriate PPE, vessel entry, working in

		confined spaces, smoke, exhaust
Carcinogenic	Chemicals in use	
Toxic	Hazardous atmosphere, asphyxiating atmosphere, chemicals in use	
Physical	Noise, radiation (ionizing, e.g. radioactive scale or non-ionizing, e.g. flares, UV, sunlight), ergonomics	
Mental	Shift patterns	
Working Hazards	Diving, working in water, working at heights, hazardous equipment, hazardous surfaces, electricity	
Transport	Excessive journeys, extreme weather, quality of roads (mitigation measures include: effective journey management)	
Project Implementation Issues		
Contracting Strategy	Prevailing influence	Stability and contractual conditions, contractor selection constraints
	Legislation	Governmental contracting requirements
	External Standards	Additional engineering and construction standards
Category	Guideword	Expanders (Examples of guide word application - not exclusive)
	External Environmental Constraints	Governmental environmental requirements
Hazards Recognition and Management	Hazard Studies	
	HSE Case	HAZOP, SAFOP, QRA, PHR, EIA, HRA, etc.
	Hazards and Effects Register	
	Project Controls	Quality assurance (change control, interdepartmental involvement and interfaces)
Contingency Planning	Geographical Infrastructure	Plant location, plant layout
	Recovery Measures	Medical support, firefighting support, spill leak / clean-up support, security / military support, evacuation
Competency	Level of Indigenous Training	Quality of local workforce and contractors
	Training Requirements	
	Level of Technology	


APPENDIX 2 (Section 3.4.3)

HAZOP worksheet sample

Facility Details: NG gathering station and pipeline net work		Operating T (min/nor/max)	50 deg C	Pressure: 200 Kpa to 6700 kpa	P & ID	Pipeline sizes		
Parameter	Guideword	Causes How?	Consequences	Protection	Recommendations	Action		
Deviation		Is it credible?	Can barriers fail?	What protection is in pre-HAZOP design?	Maximize closed recommendations	By who?	Priority 1,2,3	No. seq.
Flow	No	1. Production stopped due to power failure (Upstream)	1.1 No Hazardous consequence. 1.2 Loss of production	1. None but communication failure signal is available at station.				


Flow	No	2. Downstream of MSV manual isolation valve closed	2. Potential over	1 valves d/s in the loop are locked open.	All the valves d/s in the loop are locked open.	Provide the High pressure protection	Project engineer	2
Flow	No	3. Station is tripped.	3.1 No Hazardous consequence	2. The protection will be provided at the well head for the individual flow lines.	2. The protection will be provided at the well head for the individual flow lines.			
Flow	No	4. Failure of the beam Pump when only one pump is hooked up to the MSV.	4.1 No Hazardous consequence.	3.2 Loss of production	Station 1 trips and station 2A facilities available.	Station 1 trips and station 2A facilities available.		
Flow	No	5. Flow line rupture by third party when only one pump is hooked up to the MSV.	5.1. HSE impact	4.2 Loss of production	None	None but Pump stop indication is available at stations		
Flow	Reverse	2. Reverse flow from MSV to well in case the well is shut.	5.2 Loss of Production	No Hazardous consequence	Check valves are provided.			

APPENDIX 3 : Typical Flow Diagram of Natural Gas gathering station and pipeline (Section 3.6)




APPENDIX: 4 (Section 4.7.2)

4.1 a) FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF TYPICAL NATURAL GAS GATHERING STATION GAS LEAK




The intermediate events such as leak from compressor (A) and leak from dehydration unit is shown in Figure: 4.1 b and Figure 4.1 c.

4.1 b FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF LEAK FROM COMPRESSOR




The causes of failure of flange joints, gasket, coolant oil and operational error are contribute to the intermediate element of compressor leak is established.

4.1 C FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OF LEAK FROM VAPOURISER UNIT




APPENDIX 5 (Section 4.7.3)

5.1 a) Typical Event Tree Analysis for natural gas pipeline Leakage



5.1 b) Typical event tree analysis for natural gas pipeline Leakage



APPENDIX 6 (Section 4.10.1)

Generic failure frequency for natural gas gathering station equipment's and component's based on OGP

S.No	Equipment Name	Type	0 to 3 mm (2mm)	(3 to 10 mm)7mm	(10 to 50 mm)22mm	(50 to 150 mm)70mm	150mm or more than 150 mm
1	1st stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
2	Booster compressor 1st stage	Compressor	6.70E-03	2.60E-03	1.00E-03	1.90E-04	1.10E-04
3	Booster compressor 2nd stage	Compressor	6.70E-03	2.60E-03	1.00E-03	1.90E-04	1.10E-04
4	Booster compressor 3rd stage	Compressor	6.70E-03	2.60E-03	1.00E-03	1.90E-04	1.10E-04
5	Booster compressor 4th stage	Compressor	6.70E-03	2.60E-03	1.00E-03	1.90E-04	1.10E-04
6	1st stage cooler	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
7	2nd stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
8	2nd stage cooler	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
9	3rd stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
10	3rd stage cooler	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04

11	4th stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
12	4th stage cooler	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
13	Dehydration. Inlet Gas KOD	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
14	Glycol contractor-Top	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
15	Glycol contractor-Bottom	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
16	Cold recover exchanger	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
17	Chiller	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
18	LT Separator	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
19	Glycol Regenerator	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
20	Glycol flash vessel	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
21	Glycol Exchanger	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
22	Glycol booster pump	Pump	5.10E-03	1.80E-03	5.90E-04	9.70E-05	4.80E-05
23	Glycol Transfer pump	Pump	5.10E-03	1.80E-03	5.90E-04	9.70E-05	4.80E-05
24	Glycol cooler	Heat exchanger	2.20E-03	1.10E-03	5.60E-04	1.40E-04	1.20E-04
25	Tie in up to flares	Piping	4.10E-05	1.70E-05	7.40E-05	7.60E-05	0.00E+00
26	Pipeline from station 1 to 2	Pipeline	2.30E-04	3.30E-04	1.50E-04	2.90E-04	2.90E-04
27	Condensate separator	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04
28	Scrapper receiver	Process vessel	9.60E-04	5.60E-04	3.50E-04	1.10E-04	1.70E-04

APPENDIX 7 (Section 4.10.2)

Frequency estimation using parts count approach method for natural gas gathering station

S.No	Equipment Name	Type	0 to 3 mm (2mm)	(3 to 10 mm)7mm	(10 to 50 mm)22mm	(50 to 150 mm)70mm	150mm or more than 150 mm
1	1st stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
2	Booster compressor 1st stage	Compressor	1.340E-02	5.20E-03	2.00E-03	3.80E-04	2.20E-04
3	Booster compressor 2nd stage	Compressor	1.340E-02	5.20E-03	2.00E-03	3.80E-04	2.20E-04
4	Booster compressor 3rd stage	Compressor	1.340E-02	5.20E-03	2.00E-03	3.80E-04	2.20E-04
5	Booster compressor 4th stage	Compressor	1.340E-02	5.20E-03	2.00E-03	3.80E-04	2.20E-04
6	1st stage cooler	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
7	2nd stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
8	2nd stage cooler	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
9	3rd stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
10	3rd stage cooler	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
11	4th stage suction scrubber	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
12	4th stage cooler	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04

13	Dehydration. Inlet Gas KOD	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
14	Glycol contractor-Top vessel	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
15	Glycol contractor-Bottom	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
16	Cold recover exchanger	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
17	Chiller	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
18	LT Separator	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
19	Glycol Regenerator	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
20	Glycol flash vessel	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
21	Glycol Exchanger	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
22	Glycol booster pump	Pump	6.171E-03	2.18E-03	7.14E-04	1.17E-04	5.81E-05
23	Glycol Transfer pump	Pump	6.171E-03	2.18E-03	7.14E-04	1.17E-04	5.81E-05
24	Glycol cooler	Heat exchanger	7.700E-03	3.85E-03	1.96E-03	4.90E-04	4.20E-04
25	Tie in up to flares	Piping	3.280E-05	1.36E-05	5.92E-05	6.08E-05	0.00E+00
26	Pipeline from station 1 to 2	Pipeline	2.13E-08	2.13E-08	7.00E-08	3.12E-08	1.74E-05
27	Condensate separator	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04
28	Scrapper receiver	Process vessel	4.320E-03	2.52E-03	1.58E-03	4.95E-04	7.65E-04

APPENDIX 8: (Section 4.11.2)

Plant specific equipment data as per site specific conditions.

S.No	Equipment type	Number of Failure	Operating period in hr. / year
1	Process vessel	51	1450000
2	Compressor	40	752000
3	Heat exchanger	124	19900000
4	Glycol Pump	39	445000
5	Pump	39	445000
6	Road tanker	47	17100
7	Piping	6	388000000
8	Pipeline	104	5960000
9	Flange	327	3368520
11	Valve	439	1827600
12	Filters	48	12495

APPENDIX 9: (Sec 4.11.2)

Example Calculation for Process vessel

Generic data from ORDEA / OGP is assumed for calculating failure rate frequency.

Mean value = $1.4\text{e-}04$

Standard deviation = $4.24\text{e-}05$

Using equation 1 and 2, calculate shape parameter and scale parameter in gamma distribution. As we have assumed generic data as gamma distribution.

$\alpha_{\text{prior}} = 1.96\text{e-}8$

$\beta_{\text{prior}} = 1.282\text{e-}5$

Plant specific data

The failure cases and period of failure observed during the time is considered from filed specific data refer data in annexure table.

No of failure cases observed = 51

The period observed failure = 1447200

Using equation 3 and calculate the failure rate specific to the facility location.

$\lambda = \text{Failure rate} = 3.59\text{e-}05$

Using equation 4 and 5 calculate the posterior parameter of α_{Post} and β_{post} .

$\alpha_{\text{post}} = 51$

$\beta_{\text{post}} = 1525074.771$

Hence using equation 6 calculate the mean value of posterior frequency.

Posterior frequency = $3.34\text{e-}5$

Similarly the calculation is made for all the process equipments are selected for this study. The following tables show the Bayesian spread sheets which give details about the assessment of generic data with plant specific data and provide update assessment.

APPENDIX: 10 (Section 4.11.2)

Bayesian network method of NG frequency estimation

S.No	Equipment	Name	2mm	7mm	22mm	70mm	150mm	Field Failure data	Bayesian estimation
1	V-24281	1st stage suction scrubber	0.00413	0.00153	0.00163	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
2	k-2463	Booster compressor 1st stage	0.0121	0.00241	0.00176	0.00019	0.00011	5.31915E-05	5.00704E-05
3	k-2463	Booster compressor 2nd stage	0.0121	0.00241	0.00176	0.00019	0.00011	5.31915E-05	5.00704E-05
4	k-2463	Booster compressor 3rd stage	0.0121	0.00241	0.00176	0.00019	0.00011	5.31915E-05	5.00704E-05
5	k-2463	Booster compressor 4th stage	0.0121	0.00241	0.00176	0.00019	0.00011	5.31915E-05	5.00704E-05
6	E-24101	1st stage cooler	0.00712	0.00194	0.00183	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
7	E-24284	2nd stage suction scrubber	0.00413	0.00153	0.00163	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
8	E-24104	2nd stage cooler	0.00712	0.00194	0.00183	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
9	V-24287	3rd stage suction scrubber	0.00413	0.00153	0.00163	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
10	V-24107	3rd stage cooler	0.00712	0.00194	0.00183	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
11	V-24290	4th stage suction scrubber	0.00413	0.00153	0.00163	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
12	E-24110	4th stage cooler	0.00712	0.00194	0.00183	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06

13	V-24193	Dehydration. Inlet Gas KOD	0.00335	0.0012	0.00133	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
14	C-2455	Glycol contractor- Top	0.00312	0.000991	0.00107	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
15	C-2455	Glycol contractor- Bottom	0.00293	0.00121	0.00112	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
16	E-24121	Cold recover exchanger	0.00217	0.00065	0.000633	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
17	E-24123	Chiller	0.00254	0.000883	0.000819	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
18	V-24203	LT Separator	0.00217	0.000958	0.00106	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
19	V-24204	Glycol Regenerator	0.00824	0.00351	0.00396	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
20	V-24199	Glycol flash vessel	0.00468	0.00186	0.00196	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
21	E-24117	Glycol Exchanger	0.00255	0.000836	0.000825	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
22	P-24183	Glycol booster pump	0.00617	0.00182	0.00161	0.000097	0.000048	8.76739E-05	7.71939E-05
23	P-24181	Glycol Transfer pump	0.00886	0.00302	0.00293	0.000097	0.000048	8.76739E-05	7.71939E-05
24	E-24119	Glycol cooler	0.00406	0.0014	0.00115	0.00014	0.00012	6.24402E-06	6.04613E-06
25	24225-01	Tie in up to flares	2.55E- 05	3.32E-06	4.85E-06	0.000076	0.000008	1.54639E-08	1.41011E-08
26	PL_01	Pipeline from station 1 to 2	2.13E- 08	2.13E-08	7E-08	0.00029	0.00029	1.74531E-05	1.73876E-05
27	V-36224	Condensate separator	0.00253	0.00092	0.00107	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05
28	A-36145	Scrapper receiver	0.00308	0.000901	0.00138	0.00011	0.00017	3.52405E-05	3.34431E-05

APPENDIX: 11 (Section 4.11.2)

10.1 Estimation Spread sheet of initiating failure Frequency for Pipeline (Example 1)

Generic Data (Historical database)		Likelihood estimation		Bayesian estimation	
Mean Value (μ)	Standard Deviation (σ)	α -Prior	γ -Prior	α -Post	β -Post
1.45E-04	2.05E-04	2.1025E-08	0.00028983	104.000000	5963450.33
Number of Failure (x)	Time to failure (t)	$\lambda=x/t$	1.745E-05		
Plant Specific Data					

10.2 Estimation Spread sheet of initiating failure Frequency for Flange Joint (Example 2)

Generic Data (Historical data base)		Likelihood estimation		Bayesian estimation		Posterior Frequency
Mean Value (μ)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Number of Failure (x)	Time to failure (t)	α -Prior	β -Prior	1.41602E-05
2.89E-07	3.66E-07	51	1447200	8.329E-14	51.000000	
				4.642E-07	3601638.771	

10.3 Estimation Spread sheet of initiating failure Frequency for Process vessel (Example 3)

Generic Data (Historical data base)	Mean Value (μ)	1.4E-04	α -Prior	1.96E-8	Bayesian estimation	α -Post	51.000000	Posterior Frequency
	Standard Deviation (σ)	4.24E-5	γ -Prior	1.28E-5		β -Post	1525074.689	
Plant Specific Data	Number of Failure (x)	51	Likelihood estimation		$\lambda=x/t$	3.59E-05	$\lambda=x/t$	3.34E-5
	Time to failure (t)	1447200						

10.4 Estimation Spread sheet of initiating failure Frequency for Road tanker (Example 4)

Generic Data (Historical data base)		Likelihood estimation		Bayesian estimation		Posterior Frequency-Mean
Mean Value (μ)	Standard Deviation (σ)	Number of Failure (x)	Time to failure (t)	α -Post	β -Post	
4.30E-06	1.849E-11	89	6526700	89.000000	7339554.44	1.21261E-05
2.30E-06	1.2302E-06					

10.5 Estimation Spread sheet of initiating failure Frequency for Pressure Relief valve (Example 5)

Generic Data (Historical data base)		Plant Specific Data		Likelihood estimation		Bayesian estimation		α -Prior	β -Prior	Posterior Frequency
Mean Value (μ)	6.79E-06	Number of Failure (x)	14	Time to failure (t)	182760	$\lambda = x/t$	7.6603E-05	4.6104E-11	1.7115E-07	2.32338E-06
Standard Deviation (σ)	1.08E-06							α -Post	14.000000	6025711.11

APPENDIX: 12 (Section 4.12)

Frequency comparison with generic Parts Count Approach Method and Bayesian parts count approach method

S.No	Equipment Name	Generic with PCAM	Bayesian with PCAM
1	1st stage suction scrubber	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
2	Booster compressor 1st stage	1.00E-04	1.10E-04
3	1st stage cooler	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
4	2nd stage suction scrubber	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
5	Dehydration Inlet Gas KOD	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
6	Glycol contractor-Top	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
7	Glycol contractor-Bottom	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
8	Cold recover exchanger	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
9	Chiller	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
10	LT Separator	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
11	Glycol Regenerator	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
12	Glycol flash vessel	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
13	Glycol Exchanger	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
14	Glycol booster pump	9.34E-05	4.80E-05
15	Glycol cooler	2.12E-05	1.20E-04
16	Tie in up to flares	1.13E-08	7.60E-05
17	Pipeline from station 1 to 2	1.39E-05	2.90E-04
18	Condensate separator	1.50E-04	1.70E-04
19	Scrapper receiver	1.50E-04	1.70E-04

APPENDIX: 13

PAPERS PUBLISHED / UNDER REVIEW

S. No	Paper Title	Journal Details
1	Risk assessment study for LPG Storage and handling system of heat treatment plant	International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering, (ISSN 2250-2459 Volume 5, Issue 7, July 2015)
2	Consequence analysis of hydrogen storage tank facility: a case study approach by using PHAST	International Journal of Applied Engineering Research and Development. Vol. 5 Issue 3, August 2015, 1-10
3	Study of hazard identification techniques adopted by oil and gas industries for risk assessment	International Journal of Management, Information Technology and Engineering, ISSN (P): 2348-0513, ISSN (E): 2454-471X, Vol. 3, Issue 10, Oct 2015, 117-126
4	Fire, Explosion and Dispersion Modelling of Automatic LPG Distribution System of High Rise Building Apartment.	IJSTE-International Journal of science technology and engineering. Volume 2, Issue 4, 276-283, October 2015.
5	Risk Assessment – Tool to Minimize the Accidents.	Journal of Pollution Research 31 (1), 77-82, 2014
6	Risk assessment of natural gas gathering station and associated pipeline.	International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics. ISSN 0973-6085, 12, 2 (2017), 225-240 Research India Publications.