


| Name: | |  | |
|--|--|--|------|
| Enrolment No: | | | |
| UPES End Semester Examination, December 2024 | | | |
| Course: Law of Contract-I Program: BA,LL.B/BBA,LL.B/B.com, LL.B/LLB (Hons.) Course Code: CLCC1002 | | Semester: I Time: 3 hours Max. Marks: 100 | |
| Instructions: | | | |
| SECTION A (5Qx2M=10Marks) | | | |
| S. No. | | Marks | CO |
| Q 1 | Differentiate between Offer and Invitation to Offer. | 2 | CO1 |
| Q 2 | A promise that lacks _____ is known as a <i>Nudum Pactum</i> . | 2 | CO1 |
| Q 3 | "Restitution is a legal remedy aimed at preventing unjust enrichment by requiring a party to return benefits unjustly received." <i>State True or False.</i> | 2 | CO1 |
| Q 4 | X agrees to pay Y \$10,000 if a certain ship arrives in port by March 1. The ship encounters a severe storm and does not arrive until March 5. Y demands the payment from X, arguing that X should still pay since the delay was beyond anyone's control. Is Y entitled to receive the payment? | 2 | CO1 |
| Q 5 | Anticipatory Breach is covered under section of the Indian Contract Act. | 2 | CO1 |
| SECTION B (4Qx5M= 20 Marks) | | | |
| Q 6 | Differentiate between Fraud and Misrepresentation. State case laws to substantiate your answer. | 5 | CO 2 |
| Q 7 | A and B enter into an agreement where A bets ₹10,000 that a specific cricket team will win a match, and B accepts the bet. After the match, A wins but B refuses to pay. Based on the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, analyze whether A can enforce this agreement in a court of law. | 5 | CO 2 |
| Q 8 | X and Y enter into a contract for the sale of a specific consignment of goods, believing it to be in transit. However, unknown to both parties, | 5 | CO 2 |

| | | | |
|--|---|----|------|
| | the goods were destroyed before the contract was made. Analyze the validity of the contract in light of the provisions on mistake under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. | | |
| Q 9 | A mistakenly pays ₹50,000 to B, believing that B is his creditor. Upon realizing the mistake, A demands the money back, but B refuses to return it. Analyze the situation in light of the provisions relating to quasi-contracts under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Would A be entitled to recover the amount? | 5 | CO 2 |
| SECTION-C (2Qx10M=20 Marks) | | | |
| Q 10 | <i>“Every man shall be at liberty to work for himself, and shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the State of his labour, skill or talent, by any contract that he enters into.”</i> In the light of above statement examine the legal principle behind the <i>Agreement in Restraint of Trade</i> under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Analyze its applicability and exceptions with relevant judicial decisions. | 10 | CO3 |
| Q 11 | Analyze the doctrine of Public Policy under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. How does the principle limit the enforceability of contracts while safeguarding societal interests? Support your answer with judicial decisions and examples, highlighting instances where the courts have expanded or restricted the scope of public policy to address evolving societal norms. | 10 | CO3 |
| SECTION-D (2Qx25M=50 Marks) | | | |
| | | | |
| Q 12 | <p>A software development company, Tech Solutions Pvt. Ltd., entered into a contract with Green Park Hospitals, a large healthcare provider, to create custom software for managing patient records. The contract, signed on March 1, stipulated that Tech Solutions would deliver the software by August 1 for a fixed payment of ₹20 lakh.</p> <p>Tech Solutions hired additional software engineers and leased new equipment to meet the deadline. However, in mid-May, the government issued an emergency order in response to a severe cybersecurity threat, temporarily banning all new software installations for healthcare providers until new security regulations were implemented. As a result, Green Park Hospitals could not receive the software as planned, and Tech Solutions had to halt the development process. The order was lifted only in late October, after the initial deadline had passed.</p> | 25 | CO 4 |

| | | | |
|------|---|----|------|
| | <p>By then, Green Park Hospitals decided not to go ahead with the software, as they had opted for a different solution. Tech Solutions claimed ₹20 lakh in payment under the contract, as well as ₹5 lakh for expenses incurred in hiring and leasing equipment. Green Park Hospitals, however, refused, arguing that the contract had been frustrated due to the unforeseen government order.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Does the government cybersecurity order qualify as an unforeseeable event that renders the performance of the contract between Tech Solutions and Green Park Hospitals impossible? Support your answer with the help of provisions of the Indian Contract Act and relevant case laws. (15 Marks) 2. In the event that frustration applies, does either party have a legal claim for compensation or reimbursement of expenses incurred under such contract? Support your answer with the help of provisions of the Indian Contract Act and relevant case laws. (10 Marks) | | |
| Q 13 | <p>Sunshine Events Ltd., a company specializing in event management, entered into a contract with City Sports Complex to organize an international sports event scheduled for December 15. The contract specified that Sunshine would rent the sports complex for ₹30 lakh, with full payment due one month before the event. Sunshine also invested ₹10 lakh in advertising, ticket sales, and hiring special equipment for the event. The contract stated that any cancellation by either party would result in a penalty of ₹15 lakh.</p> <p>On November 10, the City Sports Complex informed Sunshine that, due to unforeseen structural repairs, the complex would be unavailable on the date of the event. Sunshine tried to secure an alternative venue but could not find one at such short notice. Sunshine subsequently sued the City Sports Complex, seeking ₹55 lakh damages, which included the rent amount (₹30 lakh), money spent on event preparations (₹10 lakh) and ₹15 lakh penalty for cancellation as mentioned in the contract.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Can Sunshine Events claim the full ₹55 lakh in damage from the City Sports Complex? Discuss the kinds of remedies available for breach of contract under the Indian Contract Act. Support your answer with the help of provisions of the Indian Contract Act and relevant case laws. (15 Marks) | 25 | CO 4 |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | <p>2. Should the ₹10 lakh that Sunshine spent on preparations be compensated, considering the concept of remoteness of damages? Support your answer with the help of provisions of the Indian Contract Act and relevant case laws. (10 Marks)</p> | | |
|--|--|--|--|

Legal Provisions

2. Interpretation-clause.—In this Act the following words and expressions are used in the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears from the context:—

(a) When one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal;

(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise;

(c) The person making the proposal is called the “promisor”, and the person accepting the proposal is called the “promisee”;

(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;

(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement;

(f) Promises which form the consideration or part of the consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises;

(g) An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void; (h) An agreement enforceable by law is a contract;

(i) An agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of the other or others, is a voidable contract;

(j) A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable.

3. Communication, acceptance and revocation of proposals.—The communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptances, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting or revoking by which he intends to communicate such proposal, acceptance or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.

4. Communication when complete.—The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The communication of an acceptance is complete,— as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. The communication of a revocation is complete,— as against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course of transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as to be out of the power of the person who makes it; as against the person to whom it is made, when it comes to his knowledge.

5. Revocation of proposals and acceptances.—A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards. An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not afterwards.

6. Revocation how made.—A proposal is revoked— (1) by the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other party; (2) by the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or, if no time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time, without communication of the acceptance; (3) by the failure of the acceptor to fulfil a condition precedent to acceptance; or (4) by the death or insanity of the proposer, if the fact of his death or insanity comes to the knowledge of the acceptor before acceptance.

7. Acceptance must be absolute.—In order to convert a proposal into a promise, the acceptance must— (1) be absolute and unqualified; (2) be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes the manner in which it is to be accepted. If the proposal prescribes a manner in which it is to be accepted, and the acceptance is not made in such manner, the proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist that his proposal shall be accepted in the prescribed manner, and not otherwise; but if he fails to do so, he accepts the acceptance.

8. Acceptance by performing conditions, or receiving consideration.—Performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of the proposal.

9. Promises, express and implied.—In so far as the proposal or acceptance of any promise is made in words, the promise is said to be express. In so far as such proposal or acceptance is made otherwise than in words, the promise is said to be implied.

10. What agreements are contracts.—All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in 1 [India] and not hereby expressly repealed by which any contract is required to be made in writing² or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents.

11. Who are competent to contract.—Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.

12. What is a sound mind for the purposes of contracting.—A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract, if, at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests. A person who is usually of unsound mind, but occasionally of sound mind, may make a contract when he is of sound mind. A person who is usually of sound mind, but occasionally of unsound mind, may not make a contract when he is of unsound mind.

13. “Consent” defined.—Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense.

14. “Free consent” defined.—Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by— (1) coercion, as defined in section 15, or (2) undue influence, as defined in section 16, or (3) fraud, as defined in section 17, or (4) misrepresentation, as defined in section 18, or (5) mistake, subject to the provisions of sections 20, 21 and 22. Consent is said to be so caused when it would not have been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.

15. “Coercion” defined.—“Coercion” is the committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.

16. “Undue influence” defined.—(1) A contract is said to be induced by “undue influence” where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another— (a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. (3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other.

17. “Fraud” defined.—“Fraud” means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:— (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

18. “Misrepresentation” defined.—“Misrepresentation” means and includes— (1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (2) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains an advantage to the person committing it, or any one claiming under him; by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him; (3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.

19. Voidability of agreements without free consent.—When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion,^{1***} fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. A party to a contract whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. Exception.—If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Explanation.—A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom such fraud was practised, or to whom such misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable.

19A. Power to set aside contract induced by undue influence.—When consent to an agreement is caused by undue influence, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. Any such contract may be set aside either absolutely or, if the party who was entitled to avoid it has received any benefit thereunder, upon such terms and conditions as to the Court may seem just.

20. Agreement void where both parties are under mistake as to matter of fact.—Where both the parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.

21. Effect of mistakes as to law.—A contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in [India]; but a mistake as to a law not in force in [India] has the same effect as a mistake of fact.

22. Contract caused by mistake of one party as to matter of fact.—A contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact.

23. What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not.—The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless— it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is

fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.

In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.

24. Agreements void, if considerations and objects unlawful in part.—If any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or any part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void.

25. Agreement without consideration, void, unless it is in writing and registered, or is a promise to compensate for something done or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law.—An agreement made without consideration is void, unless— (1) it is expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being in force for the registration of [documents], and is made on account of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each other ; or unless (2) it is a promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compellable to do; or unless (3) it is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits. In any of these cases, such an agreement is a contract. Explanation 1.—Nothing in this section shall affect the validity, as between the donor and donee, of any gift actually made. Explanation 2.—An agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining the question whether the consent of the promisor was freely given.

26. Agreement in restraint of marriage, void.—Every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person, other than a minor, is void.

27. Agreement in restraint of trade, void.—Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void. Exception 1.—Saving of agreement not to carry on business of which good-will is sold.—One who sells the good-will of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the good-will from him, carries on a like business therein, provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of the business.

28. Agreements in restraint of legal proceedings, void.—Every agreement,— (a) by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights; or (b) which extinguishes the rights of any party thereto, or discharges any party thereto, from any liability, under or in respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict any party from enforcing his rights, is void to the extent.

Exception 1.—Saving of contract to refer to arbitration dispute that may arise.—This section shall not render illegal a contract, by which two or more persons agree that any dispute which may arise between them in respect of any subject or class of subjects shall be referred to arbitration, and that only the amount awarded in such arbitration shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred. Exception 2.—Saving of contract to refer questions that have already arisen.—Nor shall this section render illegal any contract in writing, by which two or more persons agree to refer to arbitration any question between them which has already arisen, or affects any provision of any law in force for the time being as to references to arbitration. Exception 3.—Saving of a guarantee agreement of a bank or a financial institution.—This section shall not render illegal a contract in writing by which any bank or financial institution stipulates a term in a guarantee or any agreement making a provision for guarantee for extinguishment of the rights or discharge of any party thereto from any liability under or in respect of such guarantee or agreement on the expiry of a

specified period which is not less than one year from the date of occurring or non-occurring of a specified event for extinguishment or discharge of such party from the said liability.

29. Agreements void for uncertainty.—Agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void.

30. Agreements by way of wager void.—Agreements by way of wager are void; and no suit shall be brought for recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager, or entrusted to any person to abide the result of any game or other uncertain event on which any wager is made. Exception in favour of certain prizes for horse-racing.—This section shall not be deemed to render unlawful a subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, made or entered into for or toward any plate, prize or sum of money, of the value or amount of five hundred rupees or upwards, to be awarded to the winner or winners of any horse-race. Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code not affected.—Nothing in this section shall be deemed to legalize any transaction connected with horse-racing, to which the provisions of section 294A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) apply.

31. “Contingent contract” defined.—A “contingent contract is a contract to do or not to do something, if some event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen.

32. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event happening.—Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event happens cannot be enforced by law unless and until that event has happened. If the event becomes impossible, such contracts become void.

33. Enforcement of contracts contingent on an event not happening.—Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if an uncertain future event does not happen can be enforced when the happening of that event becomes impossible, and not before.

34. When event on which contract is contingent to be deemed impossible, if it is the future conduct of a living person.—If the future event on which a contract is contingent is the way in which a person will act at an unspecified time, the event shall be considered to become impossible when such person does anything which renders it impossible that he should so act within any definite time, or otherwise than under further contingencies.

35. When contracts become void which are contingent on happening of specified event within fixed time.—Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything if a specified uncertain event happens within a fixed time become void if, at the expiration of the time fixed, such event has not happened, or if, before the time fixed, such event becomes impossible.

When contracts may be enforced, which are contingent on specified event not happening within fixed time.—Contingent contracts to do or not to do anything, if a specified uncertain event does not happen within a fixed time may be enforced by law when the time fixed has expired and such event has not happened or, before the time fixed has expired, if it becomes certain that such event will not happen.

36. Agreement contingent on impossible events void.—Contingent agreements to do or not to do anything, if an impossible event happens, are void, whether the impossibility of the event is known or not to the parties to the agreement at the time when it is made.

37. Obligation of parties to contracts.—The parties to a contract must either perform, or offer to perform, their respective promises, unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act, or of any other law. Promises bind the representatives of the promisors in case of the death of such promisors before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract.

38. Effect of refusal to accept offer of performance.—Where a promisor has made an offer of performance to the promisee, and the offer has not been accepted, the promisor is not responsible for non-performance, nor does he

thereby lose his rights under the contract. Every such offer must fulfil the following conditions:— (1) it must be unconditional; (2) it must be made at a proper time and place, and under such circumstances that the person to whom it is made may have a reasonable opportunity of ascertaining that the person by whom it is made is able and willing there and then to do the whole of what he is bound by his promise to do; (3) if the offer is an offer to deliver anything to the promisee, the promisee must have a reasonable opportunity of seeing that the thing offered is the thing which the promisor is bound by his promise to deliver. An offer to one of several joint promisees has the same legal consequences as an offer to all of them.

39. Effect of refusal of party to perform promise wholly.—When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance.

40. Person by whom promise is to be performed.—If it appears from the nature of the case that it was the intention of the parties to any contract that any promise contained in it should be performed by the promisor himself, such promise must be performed by the promisor. In other cases, the promisor or his representatives may employ a competent person to perform it.

41. Effect of accepting performance from third person.—When a promisee accepts performance of the promise from a third person, he cannot afterwards enforce it against the promisor.

42. Devolution of joint liabilities.—When two or more persons have made a joint promise, then, unless a contrary intention appears by the contract, all such persons, during their joint lives, and, after the death of any of them, his representative jointly with the survivor or survivors, and, after the death of the last survivor, the representatives of all jointly, must fulfil the promise.

43. Any one of joint promisors may be compelled to perform.—When two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any 1 [one or more] of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. Each promisor may compel contribution.—Each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. Sharing of loss by default in contribution.—If any one of two or more joint promisors makes default in such contribution, the remaining joint promisors must bear the loss arising from such default in equal shares.

44. Effect of release of one joint promisor.—Where two or more persons have made a joint promise, a release of one of such joint promisors by the promisee does not discharge the other joint promisor or joint promisors; neither does it free the joint promisors so released from responsibility to the other joint promisor or joint promisors.

45. Devolution of joint rights.—When a person has made a promise to two or more persons jointly, then, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract, the right to claim performance rests, as between him and them, with them during their joint lives, and, after the death of any of them, with the representative of such deceased person jointly with the survivor or survivors, and, after the death of the last survivor, with the representatives of all jointly.

46. Time for performance of promise, when no application is to be made and no time is specified.—Where, by the contract, a promisor is to perform his promise without application by the promisee, and no time for performance is specified, the engagement must be performed within a reasonable time. Explanation.—The question “what is a reasonable time” is, in each particular case, a question of fact.

47. Time and place for performance of promise, where time is specified and no application to be made.—When a promise is to be performed on a certain day, and the promisor has undertaken to perform it without application by the promisee, the promisor may perform it at any time during the usual hours of business on such day and at the place at which the promise ought to be performed.

48. Application for performance on certain day to be at proper time and place.—When a promise is to be performed on a certain day, and the promisor has not undertaken to perform it without application by the promisee, it is the duty of the promisee to apply for performance at a proper place and within the usual hours of business.

49. Place for performance of promise, where no application to be made and no place fixed for performance.—When a promise is to be performed without application by the promisee, and no place is fixed for the performance of it, it is the duty of the promisor to apply to the promisee to appoint a reasonable place for the performance of the promise, and to perform it at such place.

50. Performance in manner or at time prescribed or sanctioned by promisee.—The performance of any promise may be made in any manner, or at any time which the promisee prescribes or sanctions.

51. Promisor not bound to perform, unless reciprocal promisee ready and willing to perform.—When a contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, no promisor need perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise.

52. Order of performance of reciprocal promises.—Where the order in which reciprocal promises are to be performed is expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order; and where the order is not expressly fixed by the contract, they shall be performed in that order which the nature of the transaction requires.

53. Liability of party preventing event on which the contract is to take effect.—When a contract contains reciprocal promises, and one party to the contract prevents the other from performing his promise, the contract becomes voidable at the option of the party so prevented; and he is entitled to compensation from the other party for any loss which he may sustain in consequence of the nonperformance of the contract.

54. Effect of default as to that promise which should be first performed, in contract consisting of reciprocal promises.—When a contract consists of reciprocal promises, such that one of them cannot be performed, or that its performance cannot be claimed till the other has been performed, and the promisor of the promise last mentioned fails to perform it, such promisor cannot claim the performance of the reciprocal promise, and must make compensation to the other party to the contract for any loss which such other party may sustain by the non-performance of the contract.

55. Effect of failure to perform at fixed time, in contract in which time is essential.—When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. Effect of such failure when time is not essential.—If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time; but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than that agreed upon.—If, in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance, he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.

56. Agreement to do impossible act.—An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. Contract to do an act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful.—A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful.—Where one person has promised to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promisee for any loss which such promisee sustains through the nonperformance of the promise.

57. Reciprocal promise to do things legal, and also other things illegal.—Where persons reciprocally promise, firstly, to do certain things which are legal, and, secondly, under specified circumstances, to do certain other things which are illegal, the first set of promises is a contract, but the second is a void agreement.

58. Alternative promise, one branch being illegal.—In the case of an alternative promise, one branch of which is legal and the other illegal, the legal branch alone can be enforced.

59. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is indicated.—Where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation, or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be applied to the discharge of some particular debt, the payment, if accepted, must be applied accordingly.

60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not indicated.—Where the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no other circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits.

61. Application of payment where neither party appropriates.—Where neither party makes any appropriation, the payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time, whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing, the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionably.

62. Effect of novation, rescission, and alteration of contract.—If the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract, need not be performed.

63. Promisee may dispense with or remit performance of promisee.—Every promisee may dispense with or remit, wholly or in part, the performance of the promisee made to him, or may extend the time for such performance, or may accept instead of it any satisfaction which he thinks fit.

64. Consequences of rescission of voidable contract.—When a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained in which he is promisor. The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he have received any benefit thereunder from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received.

65. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void.—When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it

66. Mode of communicating or revoking rescission of voidable contract.—The rescission of a voidable contract may be communicated or revoked in the same manner, and subject to the same rules, as apply to the communication or revocation of a proposal.

67. Effect of neglect of promisee to afford promisor reasonable facilities for performance.—If any promisee neglects or refuses to afford the promisor reasonable facilities for the performance of his promise, the promisor is excused by such neglect or refusal as to any non-performance caused thereby.

68. Claim for necessaries supplied to person incapable of contracting, or on his account.—If a person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the person who has furnished such supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of such incapable person.

69. Reimbursement of person paying money due by another, in payment of which he is interested.—A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other.

70. Obligation of person enjoying benefit of non-gratuitous act.—Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.

71. Responsibility of finder of goods.—A person who finds goods belonging to another, and takes them into his custody, is subject to the same responsibility as a bailee.

72. Liability of person to whom money is paid, or thing delivered, by mistake or under coercion.—A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under coercion, must repay or return it.

73. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.—When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract.

—When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract. Explanation.—In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must be taken into account.

74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.—1 [When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for. Explanation.—A stipulation for increased interest from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty.] Exception.—When any person enters into any bail-bond, recognizance or other instrument of the same nature, or, under the provisions of any law, or under the orders of the 2 [Central Government] or of any 3 [State Government], gives any bond for the performance of any public duty or act in which the public are interested, he shall be liable, upon breach of the condition of any such instrument, to pay the whole sum mentioned therein. Explanation.—A person who enters into a contract with Government does not necessarily thereby undertake any public duty, or promise to do an act in which the public are interested.

75. Party rightfully rescinding the contract, entitled to compensation.—A person who rightfully rescinds a contract is entitled to compensation for any damage which he has sustained through the non-fulfillment of the contract.